Competing Capitalisms and Neoliberalism: The Dynamics of, and Limits to, Economic Reform in the Asia-Pacific by Beeson, Mark
 1
 
Competing Capitalisms and Neoliberalism: 
The Dynamics of, and Limits to, Economic Reform in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Mark Beeson 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the impact of neoliberalism on the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region 
generally and on Japan and China in particular. It argues that while the impact of 
neoliberal ideas is having an important long-term impact on the countries of East Asia, 
there remain important difference in patterns of political practice and economic 
organisation which continue to distinguish the region. Indeed, there is evidence that the 
region as a whole may be developing arrangements intended ti militate the impact of 
neoliberalism. 
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Introduction 
The ‘Asia-Pacific’ region occupies a unique place in the history of capitalist 
expansion generally and the consolidation of neoliberalism in particular. Depending 
how the region is defined – and, as we shall see, this is contentious in itself – the 
Asia-Pacific contains a number of countries that have been enthusiastic advocates of 
neoliberal reform, as well as many countries that have either actively resisted 
neoliberalism, or that have developed alternative forms of capitalist organisation in 
which market mechanisms are less prominent. The ‘Anglo-American’ economies like 
The United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have generally favoured a 
much more market-oriented economic system that their counterparts in East Asia, 
where governments have played a prominent role in actually controlling the impact of 
market forces (Zysman 1983; Whitley 1999; Weiss and Hobson 1995). Consequently, 
the Asia-Pacific contains a number of competing forms of capitalism which makes 
this region a major site of contestation about the appropriate sorts of regulatory 
frameworks within which economic activity occurs. 
 
To understand the significance and nature of this contestation it is necessary to say 
something about some of the most economically important and politically significant 
countries of this highly diverse region, and the specific historical circumstances that 
have shaped such disparate outcomes. Although the primary focus of attention in this 
chapter is the economies of East Asia, it is important to recognize at the outset that the 
US exerted a powerful influence on the overall international order within which East 
Asia’s post-war  development has occurred. As we shall see, despite the US’s 
strategic dominance it has not easily been able to encourage or impose the sort of 
neoliberal order it has promoted so assiduously (Mastanduno 2000). On the contrary, 
East Asian nations  have generally responded to and actually mediated market forces 
or neoliberalism in highly distinctive ways. The key historical interactions that have 
shaped capitalist development in East Asia are briefly mapped in the first section of 
this chapter, before moving on to a more detailed consideration of some of the most 
important countries of the region and their distinctive patterns of economic 
organization. Particular attention is paid to Japan and China; not only are they the 
largest economies of the region and the most influential political actors, but their 
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respective experiences exemplify much that is distinctive and at odds with 
increasingly pervasive neoliberal model. 
 
The central argument of this chapter is that, although the organization of economic 
activity retains many distinctive features that are deeply embedded in the societies and 
political practices of the East Asian parts of the Asia-Pacific, ideas and modes of 
organization associated with neoliberalism – understood here as the privileging of 
market forces in public and private sector activities1 -  are becoming more influential. 
China’s integration into the wider global economy and the profound domestic changes 
this is generating are the most dramatic examples of this trend. But Japan is also 
undergoing a major process of economic restructuring, one that is having a 
concomitant impact on the ideas and values that have shaped both Japanese society 
and the array of political and economic relations that are associated with the 
‘developmental state’ Japan pioneered. And yet, despite these important long-term 
changes, there is a continuing desire on the part of many East Asian governments to 
continue ‘managing the market’ and the impact of neoliberalism, albeit on a regional 
rather than simply a national basis. 
 
The Asia-Pacific in Historical Context 
 
The idea of the Asia-Pacific highlights the contested and socially constructed nature 
of regional identities (Dirlik 1992). This is a potential problem for political elites 
anywhere that may wish to impose or encourage the adoption of uniform economic 
structures and regulatory environments in order to facilitate economic activity and 
reduce ‘transaction costs’. It is an especially acute dilemma in the Asia-Pacific region, 
however, because such an entity not only has little resonance with many of the elites 
of the putative region (to say nothing of the mass of the individual nationally-
demarcated populations), but the arbitrarily conceived region contains countries that 
have profoundly different views about how states, societies and markets should be 
organized. This remains an issue that shapes interactions between the various 
countries of the region.  
 
When seen in historical context the artificiality of the Asia-Pacific, the potential 
contradictions and tensions it contains, and the persistence of difference in economic 
structures and political practice that distinguishes it, becomes more explicable. It is 
important to remember that the East Asian parts of the Asia-Pacific have been 
incorporated into the expanding global economy relatively recently, generally under 
fairly traumatic circumstances. China and Japan highlight the very different ways 
countries can respond to the historical challenge of capitalist expansion, initially from 
Western Europe, and more recently from the United States (Moulder 1977). In 
China’s case European imperialism inaugurated a ‘century of shame’, internal 
collapse, and the eventual turn to communism. In Japan’s case, although the 
accommodation of ‘western’ economic, political and strategic challenges sparked a 
domestic transformation, Japan’s response was much more successful in that it 
remained independent, maintaining the array of distinctive political and economic 
relationships that would eventually underpin what Chalmers Johnson (1982) famously 
described as the developmental state. 
 
The significance of the developmental state, in which the state - or more accurately in 
Japan’s case – technically competent,  bureaucratic elites, plan the course of national 
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development in the ‘national interest’, cannot be underestimated. Despite the 
problems that the Japanese economy experienced during the 1990s (Katz 1998), the 
influence of the developmental state model across the region has been immense 
(Woo-Cumings 1999). While not all other countries may have had the requisite ‘state 
capacity’, especially  uncorrupt, competent planners, or the favorable historical 
circumstances to replicate Japan’s success, the key point to emphasize is that the 
planned approach to economic development stands in stark contrast to the idealized 
neoliberal model. Before considering the implications of this in any detail, however, it 
is necessary to explain why a state-led approach to development has persisted for so 
long in East Asia. 
 
The key comparative question to ask about East Asia is: Why do neoliberal ideas 
seem to be making major inroads into former bastions of state-led development and 
more interventionist styles of economic management at this particular moment of 
history? While the dynamics are complex and multifaceted, one of the most important 
factors is only indirectly connected to questions of economic reform. The geopolitical 
context in which initially Japan, and latterly a subsequent generation of 
developmental states, emerged in East Asia was dominated by the Cold War. The idea 
of an East Asian, let alone an Asia-Pacific region was foreclosed by the bipolar nature 
of the post-World War II order. Consequently, the sort of liberal economic order that 
the US successfully institutionalized in much of ‘the West’ either directly or through 
the auspices of new, influential international financial institutions (IFIs) like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and what would become the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), did not take hold in the same way in East Asia 
(Latham 1997). The ideologically fractured nature of East Asia, and the concomitant 
privileging of security issues by the US meant that, not only  did the US assist the 
emerging capitalist economies of the region with their reconstruction and 
development, but in the context of the geopolitical stand-off with their communist 
adversaries, the Americans were prepared to tolerate an array of mercantilist, state-
dominated practices which they did not condone (Beeson forthcoming). 
 
As a result, the institutions and practices that the US created and championed in the 
aftermath of the Second World War did not have as much influence in East Asia as 
they did in Western Europe. At one level this was simply because countries like China 
remained communist and were thus out of the American-led sphere of influence. But 
even those countries that were allied to the US were not pressured to impose 
potentially difficult or destabilizing reforms. On the contrary, the US tolerated East 
Asian-style state intervention if it meant the successful development of capitalist 
allies. Indeed, the US actively supported the generally authoritarian regimes that 
oversaw economic development in much of East Asia (Cumings 1997). The key 
points to stress from this highly truncated but vital historical background are that, 
first, a very different form of political and economic organization has developed and 
persists in much of East Asia; second, the geopolitical environment in which East 
Asia’s erstwhile ‘miracle’ economies took-off has changed profoundly. The end of the 
Cold War and the acceleration of a range of process associated with ‘globalization’ 
has fundamentally altered the context within which East Asian economies operate. 
Not only is the US freed from its Cold War constraints and able to pursue its own 
national goals and reformist agendas, but the way formerly discrete national 
economies are integrated into the wider global economy is forcing a reassessment of 
public policy settings across the region. Before we assess the impact of these changes 
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and the extent of pro-market reform, however, it is necessary to explain what is 
distinctive about East Asia and what must change if neoliberalism is to make further 
inroads there. 
 
Capitalism in East Asia 
 
Japan and China are the two largest economies in the East Asian region, although 
China has only recently achieved this status as a consequence of its remarkable 
economic expansion since the 1970s (Hale and Hale 2003).  Japan has been a crucial 
source of investment fro the region, and China’s sheer size, its expanding market and 
its concomitant strategic significance mean both countries will be central determinants 
of East Asia’s future trajectory. The original reason that East Asia attracted so much 
attention was Japan’s unparalleled economic transformation in the post-war period, 
which saw it rapidly move from war-time devastation to become the second largest 
economy in the world. The story of Japan’s post-war reconstruction has been told 
many times and there is no intention of adding to this vast literature here (but see, for 
example  Tabb 1995; Johnson 1982), but a couple of aspects of ‘the Japanese model’ 
are worth emphasizing as they remind us that there is nothing inevitable about the 
style, course, or end-point of the developmental experience.2 
 
Japan: Managing the market 
 
A number of features of Japanese-style capitalism are fundamentally at odds with the 
economic ideas and assumptions that dominate in the Anglo-American countries.  Not 
only is there is a strong tradition of radical and Marxist thinking in Japanese economic 
thinking (Morris-Suzuki 1989), for example, but more fundamentally perhaps, the 
history and structure of economic development in Japan has also entrenched very 
different patterns of relationships between key actors in business, government and the 
bureaucracy. Despite the best efforts of the Americans when they occupied Japan in 
the post-war period, it is revealing  that they were unable to erase the earlier patterns 
of business-government cooperation which had resulted in the self-conscious creation 
of large business conglomerates in the pre-war period (Johnson 1982). The 
willingness to ‘interfere’ in market processes and to self-consciously plan the course 
of economic development has been one of the defining qualities of the developmental 
state.  
 
It is noteworthy that competition, which has frequently been seen as the normatively 
desirable cornerstone of an ‘efficient’ market economy in the West, has traditionally 
been looked upon with great suspicion in Japan and in other parts of Asia that have 
followed Japan’s lead (Encarnation 1992). The market, is something which should be 
‘governed’ (Wade 1990), rather than allowed to dictate economic and even social 
outcomes. At one level this is an expression of the guiding rationale of the 
developmental state: economic development is not something that simply ‘happens’ 
as a consequence of the fortuitous, unplanned influence of market forces, but is a 
result of policymakers intervening to direct or guide economic outcomes. The notion 
of comparative advantage – a central tent of orthodox economics, which suggests that 
individual countries should exploit their endowments and do what they are ‘naturally’ 
best at – is comprehensively refuted by the historical experience of development in 
most of East Asia. Japanese planners, in defiance of the conventional western 
economic wisdom, and lacking any relevant ‘natural’ advantages, set out to create a 
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comparative advantage in a range of manufacturing industries that ultimately provided 
the backbone of its industrial economy. 
 
In its heyday, the Japanese developmental state was instrumental in transforming both 
the structure of the Japanese economy and in underpinning the particular social 
accommodation that provided benefits for much of Japan’s population. At an elite 
level, a tight nexus of political, economic and bureaucratic actors developed a highly 
effective set of relationships with which to guide economic development. At a mass 
level, the general pay-off was rapidly rising living standards and – for a privileged 
minority, at least – the guarantee of life-time employment. Compared with the 
neoliberal alternative, such outcomes may seem appealing; but it is important not to 
take too rosy or uncritical a view of some of the alternatives to the neoliberal model, 
either. The ‘iron triangle’ between business, government and the bureaucracy 
ultimately degenerated into a corrupt and self-serving pattern of behavior that 
invariably served elites at the expense of the general population (Beeson 2003a). 
Indeed, even life-time employment was something of a double-edged sword that 
compromised labour’s independence as much as it guaranteed employment (Tabb 
1995). In short, while the achievements of the developmental state were 
unprecedented and remarkable, they were not without their problems either. 
 
Nevertheless, given the undoubted success of then Japanese economy for the first 
three or four decades after the war, why would Japan’s planners or the more general 
population wish to abandon such a successful model and move toward a more market-
oriented model? The answer to this puzzle is a complex mix of the structural, the 
agential and the ideational. The key actors are to be found both in and outside Japan. 
Most obviously, Japan’s dependence on the US strategically and economically – 
especially the lucrative North American consumer markets – has made it especially 
vulnerable to American political pressure (Hughes and Fukushima 2004). As Japan’s 
economy grew, and as Japanese exports poured into American, the US initiated a 
long-running series of bilateral trade negotiations designed to open Japan up to 
American exports and liberalize the Japanese economy as a whole (Schoppa 1997). 
While these negotiations may not always have had the dramatic impact that the 
Americans hoped, it is clear that they have contributed to a gradual erosion of 
Japanese trade barriers and a greater integration of Japanese-based economic activity 
with that of the rest of the world. 
 
The structural changes that have seen Japan move toward the market model are 
multifaceted. On the one hand, the general restructuring of the international political 
economy that has seen multinationals from Japan and elsewhere become outward-
looking and mobile (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995), has subtly changed the 
orientation of what were formerly unambiguously ‘Japanese’ firms. While it is 
important not to overstate this as there are important continuing differences in the way 
that companies from different countries organize themselves (Doremus et al. 1999), 
foreign competitive pressures have forced many Japanese companies to shift 
production offshore or to raise finance in international bond markets. Indeed, the 
migration of Japanese firms and the steady liberalization of the financial sector have 
fundamentally changed the internal relationships and structures of the formerly 
discrete ‘Japanese economy’ (Pempel 1999). The tight relationships that were so 
central to the operation of the Japanese economy have begun to erode and the sense of 
national orientation and commitment has also diminished. Such changes have also 
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undermined the efficacy of the developmental state. When firms can borrow freely in 
international capital markets, and when the Japanese finance sector lobbies for greater 
liberalization, the policy tools that allowed Japanese planners to guide the course of 
development simply no longer work: the state can no longer use the promise of access 
to scarce finance to cajole the private sector into behaving as it might wish (Leyshon 
1994). 
 
Japan has been vulnerable, perhaps uniquely so among the developed economies, to 
pressure from the US. It was America that insisted that Japan allow its currency to 
appreciate during the 1980s, an initiative that failed to address its intended target – 
America’s trade deficit with Japan – but which ultimately led to the ‘bubble economy’ 
in Japan (Wood 1992). The greatest significance of the bubble economy - which saw 
a massive rise and fall in the value of Japanese shares and real estate - as far as this 
discussion is concerned, is that it undermined the performance of the Japanese 
economy and confidence in the bureaucratic elites charged with managing it. In such 
circumstances, the ideational consensus that had already taken hold across the Anglo-
American economies about the superiority, if not the inevitability, of neoliberalism as 
the preferred mode of public policy became more prominent in Japan. It is difficult to 
overstate just what a transformation has occurred in the way the ‘Japanese model’ is 
now viewed (see, for example, Porter, Takeuchi and Sakakibara 2000), potentially 
paving the way for a transformation of public policy along neoliberal lines. However, 
the crucial difference between Japan and countries like the US and Australia, is that 
while the rhetoric of neoliberal-style reform may be endlessly invoked, its application 
is uncertain and partial. There are powerful vested interests that continue to benefit 
from the existent order: unemployment rates remain comparatively low in Japan 
despite the economic slow-down and significant market-oriented reform would 
undoubtedly further erode job security. Similarly, the iron triangle has not 
disappeared and is still capable of frustrating reformist efforts. In short, many 
Japanese benefit form the old order and resist the untried and potentially disruptive 
market model (Lincoln 2001). The flip side of embodied obstacles to change is a 
comparative lack of political leverage amongst the domestic champions of 
liberalization (Tilton 1998). 
 
The Japanese experience suggests a number of things about the potential impact and 
significance of neoliberalism. First, the Japanese model demonstrated that - in 
particular historical circumstances, at least – not only are there major alternatives to 
the sort of market-dominated model promoted by the US and the IFIs, but that it can 
be highly successful and widely emulated. The second point to make is quite 
different, though: once the state’s ability to manage the ‘national economy’ is eroded 
by long-run structural changes in the international political economy, which affect the 
way local firms and financial institutions are articulated with ‘external’ economic 
forces and actors, then there is an inevitable diminution of the capacity and legitimacy 
of the state as a consequence. This last factor is vital, because for decades Japan’s 
developmental state was seen as legitimate and competent. Once this status was 
undermined, especially as a consequence of the poor performance of the Japanese 
economy and revelations about corruption within the ranks of Japan’s ruling elites, 
the potential for an ideational shift to an alternative model is clearly greater.  Indeed, 
the third point to make about the Japanese experience is that it is testimony to the 
highly institutionalized and embedded nature of the old order that so little has 
changed. In other words, even if advocates of neoliberal reform amongst some of 
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Japan’s business, academic and even bureaucratic elites could win the ideational or 
technical battle about the optimal form of economic organization – which remains 
highly debatable – there would still be powerful institutional obstacles to its 
implementation. 
 
China: Embracing the market 
 
That China should be the focus an inquiry into the extent of neoliberalism’s possible 
impact is remarkable, given its history and its continuing status as a nominally 
‘communist’ country. Indeed, it is only as a consequence of major geopolitical turning 
points like China’s rapprochement with the US in 1972 and the ending of the Cold 
War in 1989 (Yahuda 1996), that a discussion of the possible impact of neoliberalism 
on China makes any sense at all. But China  has a particular significance in 
contemporary debates about economic reform for a number of reasons,  not the least 
of which  being its former  status as one of the last major alternatives to what is now a 
ubiquitous capitalist system. Because China accounts for around a fifth of the world’s 
population means that whatever happens there is crucially important. The fact that 
China’s transformation into a market economy has been far more successful, better 
planned, and much less traumatic than in the Soviet Union’s is also important for 
comparative purposes. Even if there are still questions about the extent of market-
oriented reform in China, its embrace of the market and the fact that it is rapidly 
becoming a capitalist economy in all but name is a transformation of world historical 
significance. Indeed, in this regard Susan Strange (1997) is surely correct to observe 
that for all the continuing importance of, and debate about, different forms of 
capitalism (Coates 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001), it is the fact that economies are 
capitalist at all that is the significant point. In other words, the similarities between 
broadly market-oriented economies are greater than their differences to non-market 
economies. Seen in the long-run evolution of economic systems there is a degree of 
‘convergence’ in economic systems (Beeson 2002), and it is this that makes neoliberal 
ideas potentially influential on a truly global scale. 
 
Thus, examining the way that capitalism is realized in different locations at different 
times reminds us of a couple of possibilities. First, contingent factors will shape the 
precise form that any systemic form of economic organization will take: ‘Chinese 
socialism’ was very different to the Soviet Union’s, so it should come as no surprise 
that ‘Chinese capitalism’ retains distinctive local features. Second, capitalism and 
neoliberalism are not synonymous, despite the increased influence of the latter. The 
state’s desire to retain as much control as possible over market forces which has been 
such a distinctive characteristic of East Asia remains important, even if it appears to 
have been steadily eroded in the long term. However, we should not presume that 
such processes constitute a one way street or are impervious to change: the very size 
of China in particular  means that it will inevitably exert an influence on the rest of 
the world in the future 
 
The story of Peoples’ Republic of China’s (PRC) embrace of the market has been told 
in detail elsewhere (Shirk 1994; Lardy 1992), and it is sufficient to highlight some of 
the more important aspects of this change that are significant here. Two points are 
worth noting briefly, however. First, while there had been some significant economic 
development under Mao Zedong, the prospect of accelerated economic development 
through integration into the global capitalist economy was attractive to China’s 
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political elites  because it offered a vital source of legitimation for the Communist 
Party of China (CCP) (White 1993). The second point to make is that prior to the 
economic opening instituted under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, domestic institutions had 
prevailed over economic forces, allowing the CCP to effectively control the national 
economy. Once the reform process was embarked upon, however, international 
economic integration may have helped to accelerate dramatically the pace of 
economic development, but it was at the cost of diminished control over what became 
an increasingly internationalized economy (Shirk 1996). Although China’s decision to 
embrace the market and an international order dominated by the established capitalist 
powers has clearly accelerated economic development, like Japan before it, China’s 
elites have discovered that once the process of structural opening and integration is 
embarked upon, there is an inevitable diminution of both political control and change 
in the nature of ‘the Chinese economy’ itself. 
 
Whereas Japan has deliberately tried to limit foreign investment and the degree of 
foreign ownership of its economy, especially during its high growth developmental 
stage, China has welcomed foreign direct investment and it has grown enormously as 
a consequence. However, foreign ownership, especially when combined with a more 
general move to reduce the size of the public sector and encourage private enterprise, 
is fundamentally altering the structure of the Chinese economy. Privately owned 
companies are now estimated to account for about 60% of China’s overall GDP, but 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) still employ something like 35% of the urban 
workforce (Economist 2004a). More importantly in the long term, perhaps,  wholly 
foreign owned enterprises not only accounted for more than 55 per cent of China’s 
exports in 2003, but they are notoriously poor at transferring technology to the host 
nation (Gilboy 2004). China’s industrialization may be rapid, but it is highly 
dependent on external economic actors. Managing such a structural transformation 
would be a challenge for any government, but for one that is nominally communist 
and with a claim to represent the interests of the proletariat it is especially acute.3  
 
What is of greatest significance in the context of this discussion is that, like Japan, 
China’s transformation has structural, agential and ideational components. 
Significantly, however, China’s communist rulers have taken the advice of the major 
IFIs about the best ways of integrating their economy into the wider world. In 
Nicholas Lardy’s (1999: 209) view, ‘it would be difficult to overstate the impact of 
China’s interaction with the World Bank and the IMF’. The IFIs have assumed an 
especially important role in promoting neoliberal ideas across the East Asian part of 
the Asia-Pacific, especially following the economic crisis of 1997/8 (Beeson 2003b). 
In China there has been an important internal debate about the impact and merits of 
‘globalization and the most appropriate ways for China to respond to its manifold 
challenges (Garrett 2001).This is not to suggest that such ideas are necessarily 
uncritically adopted (see Beeson and Islam forthcoming), but when combined with 
more subtle, structural effects, they clearly have the potential to be highly influential 
(Woods 1995).  Like Japan, China’s economic leaders discovered that once China 
became involved in the international financial system through its extensive 
borrowings from the World Bank, and especially through its activities in international 
bond and equity markets, its bureaucratic elites have been socialized into the informal 
norms and practices of the global financial sector (Lardy 1999). 
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The extent of China’s embrace of the market can be seen in a number of revealing and 
significant ways. The impact of the IFIs, for example,  is not limited to guidance and 
as agents of socialization. One of the most important manifestations of both China’s 
acquiescence to broadly neoliberal reforms, and to the influence of the IFIs, was the 
decision of China’s elites to seek membership of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). This an institution established and dominated by the major capitalist powers 
and a key instrument for the promotion of economic liberalization, which required 
China to make fundamental and far-reaching legislative changes that were designed to 
lock-in market-oriented reforms. Not only did such reforms entrench a general move 
away from direct management of the economy through the elimination of formerly 
powerful planning agencies (Fewsmith 2001), but they also required China to revise 
the PRC Constitution to create a non-discriminatory trade and investment regime 
(Potter 2001).  
 
In addition to such high profile institutional reforms, attitudes amongst significant 
sections of the Chinese population are being transformed; something that suggests the 
process of reform is irreversible. Significantly, opponents of ‘globalization’ generally, 
or market-oriented reform in particular are ‘generally outside policymaking circles 
and have little impact on Chinese policy’ (Garrett 2001: 417). Indeed, many Party 
officials are no longer concerned with attempting to reconcile the precepts of 
communist ideology with the ‘contradictions’ of the market but are, instead,  
frequently using their positions to ‘informally’ privatize state assets and turn 
themselves into entrepreneurs (Ding 2000). The fact that capitalists have now been 
invited to join the CCP is indicative of the new more ‘pragmatic’ attitude to economic 
development, famously captured in the Dengist aphorism: ‘it doesn’t matter whether a 
cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice’. Certainly the rising educated and 
increasingly wealthy young generation in China’s rapidly developing Southeastern 
provinces seem to have taken to the capitalist road with alacrity, and are more 
concerned with designer labels than Party ideology (Economist 2004b). 
 
That ‘communist’ China could so rapidly have embraced capitalism is testimony to 
the pervasiveness of and – it has to be acknowledged – the effectiveness of market-
oriented reform. Clearly, China’s opening up and adoption of increasingly market-
oriented rather than state-planned practices has been central to its rapid development 
of late.  While it is important to acknowledge that such process were initially driven 
by internal political forces rather than external systemic factors (Pearson 1999), the 
extent of the transformation and the self-reinforcing nature of the process once in 
place is hard to exaggerate. This is not to say that ‘China’ will rapidly become a 
variant of Anglo-American capitalism, however. The scale of China, the limited 
impact reforms have had on economic practices and living standards in the West, the 
continuing importance of agriculture, the persistence of powerful vested economic 
and political interests that are, if not hostile, then intent on ensuring that capitalism 
has Chinese characteristics, all suggest that neoliberalism will continue to have a 
limited purchase. There are other, constraints that could derail the seamless embrace 
of the market, too: the non-negotiable nature of Taiwan, coupled with a rising tide of 
nationalism and China’s continuing wariness of American hegemony could all 
conspire to make continuing integration into the global capitalist economy more of a 
geopolitical than a technocratic issue (Deng 2001; Sheng 1999). 
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Regionalism and neoliberalism 
 
The two most important economies of East Asia have, therefore,  been significantly 
affected by their integration into the international political economy. This is especially 
true of China, which has made a major transition from a centrally-planned, state-
dominated economic system to one increasingly predicated on market mechanisms - 
all within the space of three decades. And yet, for all the significant restructuring that 
has taken place in both China, Japan and many of the other dirigiste economies of 
East Asia, there are still important and continuing differences in the way economic 
and even political activity is organized across much of the region . This is most 
obvious in ‘communist’ China, but in much of the region close relationships between 
government and business remain much closer than they do in the Anglo-American 
economies, and the state still plays a more prominent role in shaping economic 
outcomes (Gomez 2002).  
 
If we think of neoliberalism as ‘the mobilization of state power in the contradictory 
extension and reproduction of market(-like) rule’, as Tickell and Peck (2003: 166) 
suggest, then the significance of East Asia is that it is widely associated with a 
particular form of market organization, one in which the state not only continues to 
play a prominent role, but which also seeks to mediate the impact of market forces. In 
other words, while all states may play a crucial role in providing the regulatory 
framework without which any form of capitalism would be impossible (Heilbroner 
1985), what is distinctive about many East Asian governments is that they 
deliberately seek to ‘interfere’ with market processes for a variety of social and 
political purposes in ways that are at odds with the neoliberal vision espoused by the 
US and the IFIs. This economic apostasy is not simply an ideological challenge to the 
dominant neoliberal model, it is also frequently seen as a source of ‘unfair’ advantage 
in international economic competition. Perceptions about the competitive implications 
of different forms of economic organization become especially significant when the 
US judges that its chronic trade deficits with East Asia are a consequence of 
illegitimate interference in market processes, and has the power to press for reform 
(Mastanduno 2000). The inherent potential for a ‘clash of capitalisms’ became 
apparent in the aftermath of the economic crisis that gripped much of the region in the 
late 1990s (Johnson 1998). However, it is important to recognize that ideational 
contestation over, and political tension about, the most appropriate form of capitalist 
organization pre-dated the crisis; the significance of the crisis was to provide the 
economic and political leverage with which the US and the IFIs could try to compel 
reform along more neoliberal lines (Bello 1998).  
 
As we have seen, the IFIs have been crucial mechanisms in the world-wide promotion 
of a more Anglo-American form of market-order, one associated with the Washington 
consensus. This well known paradigm of trade and financial sector liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation has never been enthusiastically embraced in East Asia 
(Beeson and Islam forthcoming), despite the existence of a number of organizations 
that were specifically intended to promote such an agenda. The Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is perhaps the most important example of 
institutional innovation with the express intention of pushing trade liberalization 
amongst the traditionally protectionist East Asian economies. While APEC’s 
consensual, technocratic approach and lack of organizational leverage may help to 
account for its minimal achievements and profile (Ravenhill 2001), it is also 
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emblematic of a more fundamental disjuncture between the East Asian and Anglo-
American members of the more broadly conceived Asia-Pacific region. Many of the 
East Asian members of APEC were far less enthusiastic about the pace and extent of 
trade liberalization than were the Americans and Australians who were its principal 
champions. In short, ‘Asia-Pacific’ institutions charged with promoting neoliberal 
reform were unable to definitively win the battle of ideas about economic policy, or 
overcome the institutionalized obstacles that inhibited  reform. 
 
Although the promotion of financial sector liberalization initially made significant 
inroads in the region, in the wake of the financial crisis, there has been some re-
thinking, and unprecedented moves designed to insulate the region as a whole from 
potentially destructive flows of mobile financial capital. In this regard, the financial 
crisis was a critical turning point in attitudes about wholesale liberalization and 
‘deregulation’. As a consequence of the crisis many of East Asia’s political and 
economic elites took the view that, not only were highly mobile, volatile flows of 
capital the principal causes of the ‘contagion’ that gripped one economy after another 
as ‘investors’ fled the region (Winters 2000), but that despite the risks and 
questionable benefits as far as the region was concerned,  the US was continuing to 
promote further liberalization because it suited the collective interests of ‘Wall St’ to 
do so (Wade 2001; Beeson 2003b). In such circumstances there was both a ground 
swell of resentment about the sorts of neoliberal reforms that were being encouraged 
upon the region (Higgott 1998), and a determination to create new mechanisms and 
relationships with which to resist them (Webber 2001). The emergence of 
‘ASEAN+3’, an exclusively East Asian regional grouping that includes both Japan, 
China, South Korea, as well as the countries of Southeast Asia, is evidence of a 
region-wide reaction and resistance to external political and economic pressures 
(Beeson 2003c). While some of the major cooperative initiatives like monetary 
cooperation may be somewhat arcane and technical, they reflect a continuing desire 
on the part of East Asian governments to control the manner and pace of economic 
integration, a recognition of the growing importance of capital flows as opposed to  
trade (Dieter and Higgott 2003), and an unwillingness to simply ‘leave it to the 
market’, or – more accurately – the agencies and actors that have historically 
encouraged more radical neoliberal reform. 
 
It remains to be seen how such relatively embryonic regional processes will work 
themselves out.  The scale of regional initiatives means that it is difficult to generalize 
about their effects. Indeed, it is important to recognize that there are growing numbers 
of supporters of neoliberal ideas within the region, partly as a consequence of long-
run structural change and integration into the global economy, partly as a 
consequence of ideational contests in which key exemplars of Asian exceptionalism 
like Japan have diminished credibility (Ravenhill 2004). This truncated discussion of 
East Asian regionalism highlights a number of important aspects about the way in 
which market-oriented behavior has expended globally. As we saw in the first section 
of this chapter, the historical circumstances in which parts of East Asia were drawn 
into the expanding capitalist system were unique, frequently traumatic, and overlaid 
on an existent array of institutionalized social, political and economic practices. 
Paradoxically, however, such factors, especially when combined with the impact of 
major historical turning points like the decolonization process, and the Cold War, 
have provided the basis for a sense of region-wide identity and mobilization (Stubbs 
2002). While states have been critical determinants of the course of economic 
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development across the region, the very nature of contemporary transnational or 
‘global’ processes means that individual nation states may of necessity need to 
cooperate to respond to such challenges. This is most obvious at the level of corporate 
restructuring, but it is also clear that the actions of either hegemonic powers or 
influential inter-governmental organizations may not be easily resisted by individual 
nations. Regional cooperation provides one possible means of more effectively 
mediating material, political and ideational forces. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
When attempting to make sense of the expanding  impact of capitalism generally or 
neoliberalism in particular, much depends upon where and when we direct our 
attention. When seen in a time frame of centuries rather than decades, it is East Asia’s 
rapid integration into the increasingly global capitalist system that is likely to prove of 
greatest significance in the long term (Braudel 1992). The reality that, to paraphrase 
Margaret Thatcher, there is no alternative to capitalism of some sort,  is one of the 
most distinctive and constraining features of the contemporary world order. And yet 
within that overarching, pervasive order there are significant and continuing 
differences in the way broadly capitalist systems are organized, and the way in which 
market forces are mediated. The Washington consensus is not universally admired 
and has not been adopted everywhere. Indeed, a substantial backlash against some of 
the major precepts of neoliberalism on normative and pragmatic grounds has forced a 
significant re-thinking of the model to include things like social safety nets and 
greater accountability (Higgott 2000; Beeson and Islam forthcoming). The point to 
emphasize is that the precise way markets are realized depends upon a specific array 
of historically contingent social and political forces that determine the way economic 
activity is organized and the relative influence market mechanisms. While market 
forces may have swept aside all other competing forms of economic organization – 
for the moment, at least - what a particular focus on the status of neoliberalism 
suggests is that the precise form they assume may continue to deviate from the 
idealized neoliberal model in significant ways. 
 
What the East Asian experience suggests, therefore, is that capitalism continues to 
display significant variation across different regions. The precise historical 
circumstances that pertain in different regions will delimit the possible range of 
economic structures, practices and relationships that are feasible in different parts of 
the world: it is not simply that there are substantial political and economic interests 
resisting Anglo-American neoliberalism in Asia, but there are significant doubts about 
whether the sort of non-state, private sector dominated patterns of relationships that 
predominate in Western Europe could be replicated in East Asia in the short-term 
even if there was a desire to do so (see Beeson 2001). In other words, in much of East 
Asia, where civil society and the private sector remain comparatively underdeveloped, 
there may be no alternative to major state intervention in promoting economic 
developmental and regulating economic activity. In such circumstances, neoliberalism 
will not only continue to be powerfully meditated by local political and social forces, 
but will continue look rather than different in East Asia to the ideal type so 
assiduously promoted by the Anglo-American nations and the IFIs they dominate. 
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1 The basic tenets of neoliberalism have been captured by John Williamson’s (1994) idea of the 
Washington consensus’, which provides a template for both neoliberal public policy, and for an 
‘appropriate’ environment for private sector economic activity. The key ideas are now the familiar 
staples of much governmental rhetoric in the ‘west’, at least:  small government, low taxation, 
deregulation, privatisation, and enhanced competition. 
2 It is important to note that Japan’s reconstruction was actively supported by the US which saw it as 
the lynchpin of capitalist development in East Asia and as a bulwark to Soviet expansionism. See 
Moulder 1977). 
3 Reconciling the competing, possibly antithetical demands of successful integration into the global 
capitalist economy, whilst simultaneously paying lip service to a Marxist-inspired ideology that is 
increasingly flouted in practice, remains one of the central challenges facing the Chinese government. 
See, Ding, X.L. 1994. 'Institutional amphibiousness and the transition from communism: the case of 
China.' British Journal of Political Science 24:293-318. 
